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OPINION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL REGARDING 
THE DISPOSITION OF PUBLIC LANDS UNDER THE 
"CLEAN ENVIRONMENT" AMENDMENT TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF MASSACHUSETTS 
By Robert H. Quinn* 
In November, 1972, the voters of Massachusetts approved an 
amendment to the state constitution which established the right to 
a clean environment for every citizen. l Subsequently, the Massa-
chusetts House of Representatives addressed several questions to 
me, as Attorney General, regarding those provisions in the amend-
ment (Article 97) requiring that acts concerning the disposition of, 
or certain changes in, the use of public lands be approved by a two-
thirds roll call vote of each branch of the Legislature.2 
The questions were as follows. 
1. Do the provisions of the last paragraph of Article XCVII of the 
Articles of the Amendments to the Constitution requiring a two-thirds 
vote by each branch of the general court, before a change can be made 
in the use or disposition of land and easements acquired for a purpose 
described in said Article, apply to all land and easements held for such 
a purpose regardless of the date of acquisition or, in the alternative, do 
they apply only to land and easements acquired for such purposes after 
the effective date of said Article of Amendments? 
2. Does the disposition or change of use of land held for park pur-
poses requires a two thirds vote, to be taken by the yeas and nays of 
each branch of the general court, as provided in Article XCVII of the 
Articles of the Amendments to the Constitution, or would a majority 
vote of each branch be sufficient for approval? 
3. Do the words "natural resources" as used in the first paragraph of 
Article XCVII of the Articles of the Amendments to the Constitution 
include ocean, shellfish and inland fisheries; wild birds, including song 
and insectivorous birds; wild mammals and game; sea and fresh water 
fish of every description; forests and all uncultivated flora, together with 
public shade and ornamental trees and shrubs; land, soil and soil re-
sources, lakes, ponds, streams, coastal, underground and surface waters; 
minerals and natural deposits, as formerly set out in the definition of 
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the words "natural resources" in paragraph two of section one of chapter 
twenty-one of the General Laws (of Massachusetts)? 
4. Do the provisions of the fourth paragraph of Article XCVII of the 
Articles of the Amendments to the Constitution apply to any or all of 
the following means of disposition or change in use of land held for a 
public purpose: conveyance of land; long-term lease for inconsistent use; 
short-term lease, two years or less, for an inconsistent use; the granting 
or giving of an easement for an inco:lsistent use; or any agency action 
with regard to land under its control if an inconsistent use? 
The proposed amendment to the Constitution was agreed to by 
the majority of the members of the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives, in joint session, on August 5, 1969 and again on May 12, 
1971, and became part of the Constitution by approval by the voters 
at the state election next following, on November 7, 1972. The full 
text of Article 97 is as follows: 
ART. XCVII. Article XLIX of the Amendments to the Constitution 
is hereby annulled and the following is adopted in place thereof:-The 
people shall have the right to clean air and water, freedom from exces-
sive and unnecessary noise, and the natural, scenic, historic, and es-
thetic qualities of their environment; and the protection of the people 
in their right to the conservation, development and utilization of the 
agricultural, mineral, forest, water, air and other natural resources is 
hereby declared to be a public purpose. 
The general court shall have the power to enact legislation necessary 
or expedient to protect such rights. 
In the furtherance of the foregoing powers, the general court shall have 
the power to provide for the taking, upon payment of just compensation 
therefor, or for the acquisition by purchase or otherwise, of lands and 
easements or such other interests therein as may be deemed necessary 
to accomplish these purposes. 
Lands and easements taken or acquired for such purposes shall not 
be used for other purposes or otherwise disposed of except by laws en-
acted by a two thirds vote, taken by yeas and nays, of each branch of 
the general court. 
I. QUESTION ONE 
The first question of the House of Representatives asks, in effect, 
whether the two-thirds roll-call vote requirement is retroactive, to 
be applied to lands and easements acquired prior to the effective 
date of Article 97, November 7, 1972. For the reasons below, I an-
swer in the affirmative. 
The Legislature did not propose this Amendment nor was it ap-
proved by the voting public without a sense of history nor void of a 
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purpose worthy of a constitutional amendment. Examination of our 
constitutional history firmly establishes that the two-thirds roll-call 
vote requirement applies to public lands wherever taken or ac-
quired. 
Specifically, Article 97 annuls Article 49, in effect since Novem-
ber 5, 1918. Under that Article the Legislature was empowered to 
provide for the taking or acquisition of lands, easements and inter-
ests therein "for the purpose of securing and promoting the proper 
conservation, development, utilization and control" [of] "agricul-
tural, mineral, forest, water and other natural resources of the com-
monwealth." Although inclusion of the word "air" in this catalogue 
as it appears in Article 97 may make this new article slightly 
broader than the supplanted Article 49 as to purposes for which the 
Legislature may provide for the taking or acquisition of land, it is 
clear that land taken or acquired under the earlier Article over 
nearly fifty years is now to be subjected to the two-thirds vote re-
quirement for changes in use or other dispositions. Indeed all land 
whenever taken or acquired is now subject to the new voting require-
ment. The original draftsmen of the Massachusetts Constitution 
prudently included in Article 10 of the Declaration of Rights a broad 
constitutional basis for the taking of private land to be applied to 
public uses, without limitation on what are "public uses." By way 
of acts of the Legislature as well as through generous gifts of many 
citizens, the Commonwealth and Massachusetts cities and towns 
have acquired parkland and reservations. To claim that new Article 
97 does not give the same care and protection for all these existing 
public lands as for lands acquired by the foresight of future legisla-
tors or the generosity of future citizens would ignore public purposes 
deemed important in Massachusettslaws since the beginning of the 
Commonwealth. 
Moreover, if this amendment were only prospective in effect, it 
would be virtually meaningless. In Massachusetts, with a life 
commencing in the early 1600s and already cramped for land, it is 
most unlikely that the Legislature and the voters would choose to 
protect only those acres hereafter added to the many thousands 
already held for public purposes. The comment of the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court concerning the earlier Article 49 is 
applicable here: "It must be presumed that the convention proposed 
and the people approved and ratified the Forty-ninth Amendment 
with reference to the practical affairs of mankind and not as a mere 
theoretical announcement."3 
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II. QUESTION Two 
In its second question the House asks, in effect, whether the two-
thirds roll-call vote requirement applies to land held for park pur-
poses, as the term "park" is generally understood. My answer is in 
the affirmative, for the reasons below. 
One major purpose of Article 97 is to ensure that the people shall 
have "the right to clean air and water, freedom from excessive and 
unnecessary noise, and the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic 
qualities of their environment." The fulfillment of these rights is 
uniquely carried out by parkland acquisition. As the Supreme Judi-
cial Court has declared: 
The healthful and civilizing influence of parks in or near congested areas 
of population is of more than local interest and becomes a concern of 
the State under modern conditions. It relates not only to the public 
health in its narrow sense, but to broader considerations of exercise, 
refreshment, and enjoyment.4 
A second major purpose of Article 97 is "the protection of the people 
in their right to the conservation, development and utilization of the 
agricultural, mineral, forest, water, air and other natural re-
sources." Parkland protection can afford not only the conservation 
of forests, water and air but also a means of utilizing these resources 
in harmony with their conservation. Parkland can undeniably be 
said to be acquired for the purposes in Article 97 and is thus subject 
to the two-thirds roll-call requirement. 
This question as to parks raises a further practical matter in 
regard to implementing Article 97 which warrants further discus-
sion. The reasons the Legislature employs to explain its actions can 
be of countless levels of specificity or generality and land might 
conceivably be acquired for general recreation purposes or for very 
explicit uses such as the playing of baseball, the flying of kites, for 
evening strolls or for Sunday afternoon concerts. Undoubtedly, to 
the average man, such land would serve as a park but at even a more 
legalistic level it clearly can also be observed that such land was 
acquired, in the language of Article 97, because it was a "resource" 
which could best be "utilized" and "developed" by being "con-
served" within a park. But it is not surprising that most land taken 
or acquired for public use is acquired under the specific terms of 
statutes which may not match verbatim the more general terms 
found in Article 10 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution 
or in Articles 39, 43, 49, 51 and 97 of the Amendments. Land origi-
nally acquired for limited or specific public purposes is thus not to 
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be excluded from the operation of the two-thirds roll-call vote re-
quirement for lack of express invocation of the more general pur-
poses of Article 97. Rather the scope of the Amendment is to be very 
broadly construed, not only because of the greater broadness in 
"public purpose", changed from "pt'J.blic uses" appearing in Article 
49, but also because Article 97 establishes that the protection to be 
afforded by the Amendment is not only of public uses but of certain 
express rights of the people. 
Thus, all land, easements and interests therein are covered by 
Article 97 if taken or acquired for "the protection of the people in 
their right to the conservation, development and utilization of the 
agricultural, mineral, forest, water, air and other natural resources" 
as these terms are broadly construed. While small greens remaining 
as the result of constructing public highways may be excluded, it is 
suggested that parks, monuments, reservations, athletic fields, con-
cert areas and playgrounds clearly qualify. Given the spirit of the 
Amendment and the duty of the Legislature, it would seem prudent 
to classify lands and easements taken or acquired for specific pur-
poses not found verbatim in Article 97 as nevertheless subject to 
Article 97 if reasonable doubt exists concerning their actual status. 
TIL QUESTION THREE 
The third question of the House asks, in effect, how the words 
"natural resources", as appearing in Article 97, are to be defined. 
Several statutes offer assistance to the Legislature, all without 
limiting what are "natural resources" . Massachusetts General Laws 
(M.G.L.) ch. 21, §1 defines "natural resources", for the purposes of 
Department of Natural Resources jurisdiction, as including: 
ocean, shellfish and inland fisheries; wild birds, including song and 
insectivorous birds, wild mammals and game; sea and fresh water fish 
of every description; forests and all uncultivated flora, together with 
public shade and ornamental trees and shrubs; land, soil and soil re-
sources, lakes, ponds, streams, coastal, underground and surface waters; 
minerals and natural deposits. 
In addition, M.G.L. ch. 12, §llD, establishing a Division of Envi-
ronmental Protection under the Attorney General, uses the words 
"natural resources" in such a way as to include air, water, "rivers, 
streams, flood plains, lakes, ponds or other surface or subsurface 
water resources" and "seashores, dunes, marine resources, wet-
lands, open spaces, natural areas, parks or historic districts or 
sites." M.G.L. ch. 214, §10A, the so-called citizen-suit statute, con-
500 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
tains a recitation substantially identical. To these lists Article 97 
would add only "agricultural" resources. 
It is safe to say, as a consequence, that the term "natural re-
sources" should be taken to signify at least these catalogued items. 
Public lands taken or acquired to conserve, develop or utilize any 
of these resources are thus subject to Article 97. 
It is apparent that the Legislature has never sought to apply any 
limitation to the term "natural resources" but instead has viewed 
the term as an evolving one which should be expanded according to 
the needs of the time and the term was originally inserted in our 
Constitution for just that reason.5 The resources enumerated above 
should, therefore, be regarded as examples of and not delimiting 
what are "natural resources." 
IV. QUESTION FOUR 
The fourth question of the House requires a determination of the 
scope of activities which is intended by the words: "shall not be used 
for other purposes or otherwise disposed of." 
The term "disposed" has never developed a precise legal mean-
ing. As the Supreme Court has noted, "The word is nomen 
generalissimum, and standing by itself, without qualification, has 
no technical signification."8 The Supreme Court has indicated how-
ever, that "disposition" may include a lease.7 Other cases on unre-
lated subjects suggest that in Massachusetts the word "dispose" can 
include all forms of transfer no matter how complete or incomplete.8 
In this absence of precise legal meaning, Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary is helpful. "Dispose of" is defined as "to 
transfer into new hands or to the control of someone else." A change 
in physical or legal control would thus prove to be determinative. 
I therefore conclude that the "dispositions" for which a two-thirds 
roll-call vote of each branch of the General Court is required in-
clude: transfers of legal or physical control between agencies of gov-
ernment, between political subdivisions, and between levels of gov-
ernment, of lands, easements and interests therein originally taken 
or acquired for the purposes stated in Article 97, and transfers from 
public ownership to private. Outright conveyance, takings by emi-
nent domain, long-term and short-term leases of whatever length, 
the granting or taking of easements and all means of transfer or 
change of legal or physical control are thereby covered, without 
limitation and without regard to whether the transfer be for the 
same or different uses or consistent or inconsistent purposes. 
This interpretation affords a more objective test, and is more 
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easily applied, than "used for other purposes." Under Article 97 
that standard must be applied by the Legislature, however, in cir-
cumstances which cannot be characterized as a disposition-that is, 
when a transfer or change in physical or legal control does not occur. 
A change of use within a governmerrtal agency o'r within a political 
subdivision would serve as an apt example. Within any agency or 
political subdivision any land, easement or interest therein, if origi-
nally taken or acquired for the purposes stated in Article 97, may 
not be "used for other purposes" without the requisite two-thirds 
roll-call vote of each branch of the Legislature. 
It may be helpful to note how Article 97 is to be read with the so-
called doctrine of "prior public use," application of which also turns 
on changes in use. That doctrine holds that 
public lands devoted to one public use cannot be diverted to another 
inconsistent public use without plain and explicit legislation authoriz-
ing the diversion. 9 
The doctrine of "prior public use" is derived from many early 
cases which establish its applicability to transfers between corpora-
tions granted limited powers of the Commonwealth, such as emi-
nent domain, and authority over water arid railroad easements. IO 
The doctrine was also applied at an early date to transfers between 
such corporations and municipalities and counties." 
The doctrine of "prior public use" has in more modern times been 
applied to the following transfers between governmental agencies or 
political subdivisions: (1) a transfer between state agencies;'2 (2) 
transfers between a state agency and a special state authority;'3 (3) 
a transfer between a special state commission and special state 
authority;'4 (4) transfers between municipalities;'5 (5) transfers be-
tween state agencies and municipalities;'6 (6) a transfer between a 
special state authority and a municipality;'7 (7) a transfer between 
a state agency and a county;'S and (8) transfers between counties 
and municipalities. IS 
The doctrine has also been applied to the following changes of use 
of public lands within governmental agencies or within political 
subdivisions: (1) intra-agency uses;20 (2) intramunicipality uses;21 
and (3) intra county uses.22 The doctrine may also possibly reach de 
facto changes in use,23 and may be available to protect reservation 
land held by charitable corporations.24 In addition to these exten-
sions of the doctrine, special statutory protections, codifying the 
doctrine of "prior public use", are afforded local parkland and com-
mons25 and public cemeteries. 26 
This is the background against which Article 97 was approved. 
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The doctrine of "prior public use" requires legislative action, by 
majority vote, to divert land from one public use to another incon-
sistent public use. As the scope of the doctrine discussed above 
indicates, the doctrine requires an act of the Legislature regardless 
of whether the land in question is held by the Commonwealth, its 
agencies, special authorities and commissions, political subdivi-
sions or by certain corporations granted powers of the sovereign. 
And the doctrine applies regardless of whether the public use for 
which the land in question is held in a conservation purpose. 
As to all such changes in use previously covered by the doctrine 
of "prior public use" the new Article 97 will only change the requi-
site vote of the Legislature from majority to two-thirds. Article 97 
is designed to supplement, not supplant, the doctrine of "prior pub-
lic use." 
Article 97 will be of special significance, though, where the doc-
trine of "prior public use" has not yet been applied. For instance, 
legislation and a two-thirds roll-call vote of the Legislature will now, 
for the first time, be required even where a transfer of land or ease-
ment between governmental agencies, between political subdivi-
sions, or between levels of government is made with no change in 
the use of the land, and even where a transfer is from public control 
to private. 
Whether legislation pending before the General Court is subject 
to Article 97, or the doctrine of "prior public use," or both, it is 
recommended that the legislation meet the high standard of specif-
icity set by the Supreme Judicial Court in a case involving the 
doctrine of "prior public use": 
We think it is essential to the expression of plain and explicit authority 
to divert [public lands] to a new and inconsistent public use that the 
Legislature identify the land and that there appear in the legislation not 
only a statement of the new use but a statement or recital showing in 
some way legislative awareness of the existing public use. In short, the 
legislation should express not merely the public will for the new use but 
its willingness to surrender or forgo the existing use.27 
Each piece of legislation which may be subject to Article 97 should, 
in addition, be drawn so as to identify the parties to any planned 
disposition of the land. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Article 97 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution 
establishes the right of the people to clean air and water, freedom 
from excessive and unnecessary noise, and the natural, scenic, his-
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toric and esthetic qualities of their environment. The protection of 
the people in their right to the conservation, development and utili-
zation of the agricultural, mineral, forest, water, air and other natu-
ral resources is declared to be a public purpose. Lands, easements 
and interests therein taken or acquired for such public purposes are 
not to be disposed of or used for other purposes except by two-thirds 
roll-call vote of both the Massachusetts Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives. 
Answering the questions of the House of Representatives, I advise 
that the two-thirds roll-call vote requirement of Article 97 applies 
to all lands, easements and interests therein whenever taken or 
acquired for Article 97 conservation, development or utilization pur-
poses, even prior to the effective date of Article 97, November 7, 
1972. The Amendment applies to land, easements and interests 
therein held by the Commonwealth, or any of its agencies or politi-
cal subdivisions, such as cities, towns and counties. 
I advise that "natural resources" given protection under Article 
97 would include at the very least, without limitation: air, water, 
wetlands, rivers, streams, lakes, ponds, coastal, underground and 
surface waters, flood plains, seashores, dunes, marine resources, 
ocean, shellfish and inland fisheries, wild birds including song and 
insectivorous birds, wild mammals and game, sea and fresh water 
fish of every description, forests and all uncultivated flora, together 
with public shade and ornamental trees and shrubs, land, soil and 
soil resources, minerals and natural deposits, agricultural resources, 
open spaces, natural areas, and parks and historic districts or sites. 
I advise that Article 97 requires a two-thirds roll-call vote of the 
Massachusetts Senate and House of Representatives for all transfers 
between agencies of government and between political subdivisions 
of lands, easements or interests therein originally taken or acquired 
for Article 97 purposes, and transfers of such land, easements or 
interests therein from one level of government to another, or from 
public ownership to private. This is so without regard to whether the 
transfer be for the same or different uses or consistent or inconsist-
ent purposes. I so advise because such transfers are "dispositions" 
under the terms of the new Amendment, and because "disposition" 
includes any change of legal or physical control, including but not 
limited to outright conveyance, eminent domain takings, long and 
short-term leases of whatever length and the granting or taking of 
easements. 
I also advise that intra-agency changes in uses of land from Arti-
cle 97 purposes, although they are not "dispositions", are similarly 
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subject to the two-thirds roll-call vote requirement. 
Read against the background of the existing doctrine of "prior 
public use", Article 97 will thus for the first time require legislation 
and a special vote of the Legislature even where a transfer of land 
between governmental agencies, between political subdivisions or 
between levels of government results in no change in the use of land, 
and even where a transfer is made from public control to private. I 
suggest that whether legislation pending before the General Court 
is subject to Article 97, or the doctrine of "prior public use", or both, 
the very highest standard of specificity should be required of the 
draftsmen to assure that legislation clearly identifies the locus, the 
present public uses of the land, the new uses contemplated, if any, 
and the parties to any contemplated "disposition" of the land. 
In short, Article 97 seeks to prevent government from ill-
considered misuse or other disposition of public lands and interests 
held for conservation, development or utilization of natural re-
sources. If land is misused a portion of the public's natural resources 
may be forever lost, and no less so than by outright transfer. Article 
97 thus provides a new range of protection for public lands far be-
yond existing law and much to the benefit of our natural resources 
and to the credit of our citizens. 
FOOTNOTES 
* Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 
(Article 97 of the Articles of Amendment, Constitution of Massa-
chusetts. 
2Mass. H. 6085 (1973); this article is an edited version of the letter 
which I sent to Hon. David M. Bartley, Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, on June 6, 1973, in response to those questions. 
30pinion of the Justices, 237 Mass. 598, 608 (1921). 
4Higginson v. Treasurer and School House Commissioners of Bos-
ton, 212 Mass. 583, 590 (1912); see also, Higginson v. Inhabitants 
of Nahant, 11 Allen 530, 536 (Mass. 1866). 
5See , DEBATE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1917-1918, at 
595. 
6Phelps v. Harris, 101 U.S. 370, 381 (1880). 
7U.S. v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526 (1840). 
8Rogers v. Goodwin, 2 Mass. 475 (1807); Woodbridge v. Jones, 183 
Mass. 549 (1903); Lord v. Smith, 293 Mass. 555 (193Ei). 
9Robbins v. Department of Public Works, 355 Mass. 328, 330 
(1969), and cases there cited. 
MASSACHUSETTS' CONSTITUTION 505 
lOSee, e.g., Old Colony Railroad Company v. Framingham Water 
Company, 153 Mass. 561 (1891); Boston Water Power Company v. 
Boston and Worcester Railroad Corporation, 23 Pick. 360 (Mass. 
1839); Boston and Maine Railroad v. Lowell and Lawrence Railroad 
Company, 124 Mass. 368 (1877); Eastern Railroad Company v. Bos-
ton and Maine Railroad, 111 Mass. 125 (1872); and Housatonic 
Railroad Company v. Lee and Hudson Railroad Company, 118 
Mass. 391 (1875). 
liSee, e.g., Boston and Albany Railroad Company v. City Council 
of Cambridge, 166 Mass. 224 (1896) (eminent domain taking of 
railroad land); Eldredge v. County Commissioners of Norfolk, 185 
Mass. 186 (1904) (eminent domain taking of railroad easement); 
West Boston Bridge v. County Commissioners of Middlesex, 10 
Pick. 270 (Mass. 1830) (eminent domain taking of turnpike land); 
and Inhabitants of Springfield v. Connecticut River Railroad Co., 4 
Cush. 63 (1849) (eminent domain taking of a public way). 
12Robbins v. Department of Public Works, 355 Mass. 328 (1969) 
(eminent domain taking of Metropolitan District Commission 
(MDC) wetlands). 
13Commonwealth v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 346 
Mass. 250 (1963) (eminent domain taking ofMDC land); see Loschi 
v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 354 Mass. 53 (1968) (eminent 
domain taking of parkland). 
14Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commission, 350 Mass. 410 
(1966) (lease of portions of Mount Greylock). 
I5City of Boston v. Inhabitants of Brookline, 156 Mass. 172 (1892) 
(eminent domain taking of a water easement); Inhabitants of 
Quincy v. City of Boston, 148 Mass. 389 (1889) (eminent domain 
taking of a public way). 
16Town of Brookline v. Metropolitan District Commission, 357 
Mass. 435 (1970) (eminent domain taking of parkland); City of Bos-
ton v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 356 Mass. 741 (1970) (eminent 
domain taking of a park). 
17Appleton v. Massachusetts Parking Authority, 340 Mass. 303 
(1960) (eminent domain, Boston Common). 
18Abbott v. Commissioners of Dukes County, 357 Mass. 784 (1970) 
(Department of Natural Resources grant of navigation easement). 
19Town of Needham v. County Commissioners of Norfolk, 324 
Mass. 293 (1949) (eminent domain taking of common and park 
lands); Inhabitants of Easthampton v. County Commissioners of 
Hampshire, 154 Mass. 424 (1891) (eminent domain taking of school 
lot). 
506 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
20S acco v. Department of Public Works, 352 Mass. 670 (1967) 
(filling of a portion of a Great Pond). 
21Higginson v. Treasurer and School House Commissioners of Bos-
ton, 212 Mass. 583 (1912) (erecting a building on a public park); see, 
Kean v. Stetson, 5 Pick. 492 (1827) (road built adjoining a river). 
22Bauer v. Mitchell, 247 Mass. 522 (1924) (discharging sewage 
upon school land). 
23See , e.g., Pilgrim Real Estate Inc. v. Superintendent of Police 
of Boston, 330 Mass. 250 (1953) (parking of cars on park area). 
24See, e.g., Trustees of Reservations v. Town of Stockbridge, 348 
Mass. 511 (1965) (eminent domain). 
25M.G.L. ch. 45. 
26M.G.L. ch. 114, §§17, 41; as to changes in use of public lands 
held by municipalities or counties generally see, M.G.L. ch. 40 
§15A; ch. 214, §3(11). 
27Robbins v. Department of Public Works, 355 Mass. 328, 331 
(1969). 
